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INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Act1 (“NLRA”) has had a rough 
half-century.  After decades of judicial and administrative limitations 
on the Act’s effectiveness, today, many of labor’s supporters are 
among the loudest critics of labor’s law.2  One reason the law has fall-
en so far short of expectations is the tendency of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the courts to read the NLRA narrowly 
and allow another legal regime—whether common law or statutory—
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 1 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 
(2006)). 
 2 As early as 1983, unions still counted 20.1% of the workforce as members, compared to 
11.3% in 2012.  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2012 (Jan. 
23, 2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.  It was in these 
early days that the AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland suggested that unions would be bet-
ter off repealing the NLRA and returning to the “law of the jungle.”  Cathy Trost & Leon-
ard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead Letter,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 
A8.  While labor law scholars have generally not gone that far, many have called for fun-
damental reforms.  See generally JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE:  THE SUBVERSION OF 
U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE 
WORKPLACE:  THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 241–306 (1990); Robert J. 
Pleasure & Patricia Greenfield, Toward Fundamental Change in U.S. Labor Law:  A Law Re-
form Framework in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 125–36 (Sheldon 
Friedman, et al. eds., 1994); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1569 (2002) (suggesting labor law reform at state or local levels); 
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over:  Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized 
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61–62 (1994) (arguing for reform to move away from 
collective bargaining); Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America, 49 
WAYNE L. REV. 685 698–702 (2003) (arguing for labor law reform that aims to slow the 
decline of unions); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice:  A Structural Approach to the 
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 660 (2010)(analyzing default and alter-
ing rules to point towards revised labor law). 
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to settle the case at bar.3  This tendency has attracted scholarly criti-
cism.4  Yet, one basic question has gone unasked and unanswered.  If 
courts have simply decided that the NLRA deserves less deference 
than other statutes with conflicting text or principles, what is wrong 
with that? 
This Article attempts to answer that question.5  It argues that the 
NLRA is a “super-statute,” worthy of special deference from the 
 
 3 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–51 (2002) (hold-
ing that undocumented workers who have had their NLRA rights violated cannot recover 
damages because such a result would violate the spirit, if not the text, of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, Pub L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)).  See also Lechmere, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (holding that employers’ right to exclude union 
organizers from their property for any reason trumps union organizers’ right to contact 
workers); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 305, 308 (1994) (“The [C]ourt allowed this naked property right to trump the sub-
stantial statutory interests of organized employees.”).  Brown University excluded graduate 
student teachers from the Act’s coverage in part to protect academic freedom, a concern 
that the Board decided precluded collective bargaining with graduate students.  342 
N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004); Elizabeth Butler Baum, Casenote, NLRB Refuses to Harm “Aca-
demic Freedom” at Universities by Permitting Graduate Students to Unionize, 56 MERCER L. REV. 
793, 801 (2005). 
 4 See, e.g., Denise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB:  Leaving Undocumented Workers 
Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 119 (2003) (arguing 
that Hoffman Plastic undercut the protection available to undocumented workers under 
U.S. labor laws); Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. Produce Dis-
posable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 (2003) (criticizing the NLRB’s decision of 
granting “employee” status to undocumented workers but denying backpay remedies); 
Cynthia A. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 
(1994) (arguing that Lechmere represents an overbroad conception of the “right to ex-
clude” supported neither by the NRLA nor state property law); Andrew S. Lewinter, 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB:  An Invitation to Exploit, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 
(2003) (arguing that the “Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic is inconsistent with 
both labor and immigration policy”); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment:  Re-
flections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 
582–83 (2007) (criticizing the “dubious policy grounds” of limiting the coverage of the 
Act); Sarah J. Bannister, Note, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions:  Science and 
Engineering Graduate Students Should be Considered Employees Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 124–25 (2005) (arguing that the “decision to deny 
graduate students ‘employee’ status under the NLRB is unjustified and irreconcilable” 
with the reality of graduate work); Ryan Patrick Dunn, Comment, Get a Real Job!  The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board Decides Graduate Student Workers at Private Universities are Not 
“Employees” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 851, 855 (2006) 
(“[T]he Board’s tradition of interpreting the NLRA exclusively through adjudica-
tion . . . reduces the reliability of its decisions.”). 
 5 While this Article will argue that the NLRA should receive a purposivist reading, it does 
not delve into exactly what the purpose of the statute is, particularly as it has been 
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.  For this rea-
son, this Article essentially ignores Taft-Hartley.  While that law is certainly relevant to 
how the NLRA’s core purpose should be interpreted, it is not clear how or why a limiting 
amendment to a super-statute necessarily makes the statute less than super.  Where the 
Taft-Hartley Act did not modify the provisions of the NLRA, those provisions should be 
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courts and vigorous enforcement by the Board.  Because it passed af-
ter a prolonged period of informed and contentious public delibera-
tion, the NLRA should be treated as more than an everyday public 
law. 
In Part I, I define “super-statutes” and argue that they should be 
given special deference by the courts.  In Part II, I analyze the admin-
istrative and political decisions made by key policymakers prior to 
passage of the NLRA and argue that the Act is a super-statute.  Final-
ly, in Part III, I examine the implications of treating the NLRA as a 
super-statute by discussing a case that would have gone the other way 
if the Supreme Court had used a super-statute analysis. 
I.  WHAT IS A SUPER-STATUTE? 
Much of the debate between judicial liberals and judicial con-
servatives can be summarized as a disagreement about which mecha-
nisms are appropriate for expanding legal rights.  Liberals have his-
torically been more comfortable expanding rights by whatever means 
is available, including, in many cases, by judicial fiat.  This has left lib-
erals open to accusations of countermajoritarianism.  Whatever the 
value of civil rights, some have argued, they should not come from 
unelected judges implementing values not shared by a majority of the 
American people.6  Whether or not this criticism is made in good 
faith, it is made; and even some liberals find it to have merit.7 
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have added some-
thing important to this ongoing discussion:  a theory of progressive 
constitutionalism that is both democratic and resistant to the ebbs 
and flows of popular prejudice.8  They argue that some statutes play a 
 
given their original intent as part of the purposivist inquiry discussed in Part III.  Howev-
er, a full exploration of the role of later enactments on a super-statute, while a worthwhile 
inquiry, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 6 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962). 
 7 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 7 (1999).  While Sunstein is not opposed to all judicial review, his chosen ap-
proach is a jurisprudence in which “judges know that they may be prone to error, and for 
this reason they are usually cautious about foreclosing outcomes of political processes 
that do not accord with an ambitious and possibly incorrect understanding of democratic 
ideals.”  Id. at 26. 
 8 Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory has evolved through a series of articles.  See William 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215–16 (2001); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2007).  And, 
most recently, the theory is explained in a book.  WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN 
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) [herein-
after ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES]. 
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role analogous to that of constitutional amendments.  These “super-
statutes” are impervious to changing electoral coalitions; they are 
protected by the judiciary even beyond the four corners of their text; 
and they are capable of evolving so that they remain effective as times 
change.  Eskridge and Ferejohn identify a large number of candi-
dates for super-statute status, ranging from Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act.9 
At first glance, Eskridge and Ferejohn’s theory is both descriptive-
ly and normatively compelling.  Descriptively, it accounts for Ameri-
can history better than a strictly constitutional view of American 
rights.  Most Americans asked to list the basic guarantees associated 
with American citizenship would likely mention at least a few rights 
that can be found only in statutes.  The right to be free of racial dis-
crimination in the private workplace is the best example.10  Eskridge 
and Ferejohn have captured an important truth about America’s le-
gal history by recognizing that these rights are closer to constitutional 
principles than to run-of-the-mill public laws. 
Perhaps more important, Eskridge and Ferejohn offer a means for 
expanding rights that is less resistant to change than the constitu-
tional amendment process prescribed by Article V of the U.S. Consti-
tution.11  And, super-statutes need not share constitutional law’s liber-
tarian bias.  They can do more than restrain government; they can 
impose obligations on government and private actors that may pro-
vide more concrete fulfillment to most citizens than the purely nega-
tive rights guaranteed by most constitutional amendments.12 
Eskridge and Ferejohn describe three basic characteristics that de-
fine super-statutes.  First, super-statutes pass after an unusually in-
tense period of public deliberation.13  Second, super-statutes require 
cooperation by several institutions working “together as well as pro-
tecting their own authority.”14  Finally, super-statutes become en-
 
 9 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26. 
 10 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 11 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 48–49. 
 12 Id. at 5, 26, 40–42. 
 13 Id. at 7, 26; Eskridge & Ferejohn, Super-statutes, supra note 8, at 1230–31 (finding that su-
per-statutes substantially alter the “then-existing regulatory baselines” with a new princi-
ple or policy and often emerge after a “lengthy period of public discussion and official 
deliberation”). 
 14 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 7; see also Eskridge & Fere-
john, Super-statutes, supra note 8, at 1231 (arguing that an “essential feature of the super-
statute” is the “feedback loop” among the various branches, including “elaboration [of 
the super-statute] from administrators and judges, whose work is then subject to mean-
ingful scrutiny and correction by the legislature or even the citizenry”). 
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trenched over time as courts and other actors treat them with special 
deference.15 
This final element of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition bears 
discussion.  If super-statutes, by definition, become and remain en-
trenched in American culture over time, then super-statute theory 
has little prescriptive force.  Imagine that judges, as a group, began to 
limit the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the narrowest possible reading of 
its text.  A scholar sympathetic to super-statutes might well conclude 
that those judges had done something wrong; they failed to defer to a 
super-statute.  But the judges would have an easy response:  if we do 
not defer to the Act, then it is not a super-statute. 
This Article rejects Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition of super-
statutes as only those laws that remain entrenched over time.  It 
therefore cannot rely on standard judicial practice to justify treating 
super-statutes with special deference.  As a matter of empirical fact, 
courts may often fail to give super-statutes special respect.16  This 
premise raises the normative question in its pure form:  given that 
judges may not always treat super-statutes with special respect, can we 
find normatively compelling reasons why they should do so?  This Ar-
ticle argues that the answer is yes, and the remainder of this Part is 
devoted to explaining what those reasons might be. 
A. The Democracy Rationale 
This Article’s emphasis on super-statutes reflects in part the no-
tion that, in a democracy, laws that more closely reflect the popular 
will have special legitimacy.  Professor Bruce Ackerman has taken this 
argument one step further.  In his We the People series,17 Ackerman dis-
tinguishes between two types of lawmaking:  higher and lower.  When 
Congress, exercising powers delegated by the people, enacts public 
laws, it is engaged in lower lawmaking.  Higher lawmaking occurs 
when the people themselves exercise lawmaking authority.18 
Ackerman points to three “constitutional moments” during which 
Americans engaged in higher lawmaking:  the Founding, Reconstruc-
 
 15 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 7, 26. 
 16 The NLRA presents one instance in which, as this Article will argue, courts have failed to 
provide a super-statute with even average respect. 
 17 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1:  FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2:  TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [herein-
after ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]. 
 18 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 3–33. 
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tion, and the New Deal.19  In each of these periods, Americans be-
came unusually engaged in the lawmaking process and effected fun-
damental changes in the country’s legal framework.  But, none of 
these periods of higher lawmaking followed the formal rules for 
amending the Constitution.  The Founders rejected the amendment 
process contained in the Articles of Confederation and invented new 
rules to meet their needs.20  The Reconstruction Congress manipulat-
ed the requirements for state participation in the ratification of new 
constitutional amendments.21  And, the New Deal’s changes in consti-
tutional law occurred entirely outside of the Article V process.22  Yet, 
each of these eras produced lasting changes in constitutional law that 
are now almost universally accepted.23 
Ackerman approves of this unorthodox amendment process.  In 
part, he believes that it reflects a fair reading of the Constitution’s 
prescribed procedure for its own amendment, a proposition his crit-
ics find far-fetched.24  But, Ackerman also justifies his theory on more 
functionalist grounds.  From time to time, Americans find that some 
part of their system of government requires a general overhaul that 
they can trust to last beyond the next election cycle.  Sometimes, they 
express this belief through a constitutional amendment; sometimes 
they do not.  The decision about whether to amend the Constitution 
often has as much to do with political contingency as with principle.25  
 
 19 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 58.  He has subsequently expanded his theory 
to include other periods of constitutional change, including the civil rights era.  See Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007) (“A second great 
pathway involves the enactment of landmark statues that express the new regime’s basic 
principles . . . [such as] the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.”). 
 20 ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 34. 
 21 Id. at 99, 101–04, 110–11. 
 22 Id. at 337–342. 
 23 The change in constitutional interpretation that came with the New Deal is both less like-
ly to be accepted and less likely to be thought of as a change in constitutional law compa-
rable to the change that comes with a constitutional amendment.  Ackerman devotes 
much of WE THE PEOPLE’s second volume to explaining why the New Deal should be con-
sidered a constitutional moment on par with the Founding and Reconstruction.  See id. at 
255–382.  However, one need not accept this claim to accept the considerably less ambi-
tious argument made in this Article. 
 24 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania:  The Quest for a Common Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731, 1742–46 (1999) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 
2:  TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Re-
flections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1239–45 
(1995) (“Professor Ackerman has failed to exercise such care in constitutional interpreta-
tion.”). 
 25 Ackerman argues persuasively that the Reconstruction Congress would likely not have 
pursued constitutional change had Lincoln lived and been able to appoint a more civil 
rights-friendly Supreme Court.  ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 17, at 265, 
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But, however they express themselves, the people have a right to 
change their governing institutions when they express a clear desire 
to do so. 
In the constitutional context, Ackerman’s thesis is fairly radical 
and has been widely criticized.26  But, his basic premise—that some 
lawmaking is higher than other lawmaking—has both intuitive and 
theoretical appeal.  Ackerman has simply pointed out that not all laws 
are created equal.  America has experienced moments when the 
people themselves are more actively engaged in the lawmaking pro-
cess.  While it may be difficult to say when exactly the people engage 
in higher lawmaking, surely courts can distinguish between the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964—passed after extensive public debate with the 
whole world watching—and the latest special-interest giveaway draft-
ed by industry lobbyists and rammed through Congress in the dead 
of night.  In a country founded on republican principles, courts 
should treat the former with more respect than the latter. 
B. The Epistemic Rationale 
One way to think of super-statutes is as pieces of legislation pro-
duced by a process that is closer to direct democracy than the tradi-
tional legislative process.  Super-statutes are passed when citizens are 
focused on a particular issue.  At these times, lawmakers who want to 
be reelected are more likely to defer to their constituents on whatev-
er issue has caught the public eye.  More so than other laws, super-
statutes are therefore the product of the popular will, not the will of 
government officials. 
If we had reason to believe that the popular will is more likely to 
be correct, this would provide a reason to defer to super-statutes; and, 
we do.  As the Marquis de Condorcet demonstrated in the 1700s, un-
 
274–78.  By the same token, the New Dealers might have pursued a constitutional 
amendment, a strategy that was pursued up until the 1937 Switch in Time, had FDR died 
and his appointments been made by conservative Vice President, John Garner.  Id. at 
271–74. 
 26 See Gerhardt, supra note 24, at 1735–36, 1767–73 (asserting Ackerman inconsistently fol-
lows his methodology); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 117 (1994) (challenging Ackerman’s theory of constitutional in-
terpretation because it runs counter to the importance of the text); Tribe, supra note 24, 
at 1240 (“Professor Ackerman has failed to exercise such care in constitutional interpreta-
tion.”); see generally Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction:  A Critique 
of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (reviewing 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 1:  FOUNDATIONS (1991)) (considering critically 
Ackerman’s thesis); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 
918 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)) (finding that Acker-
man’s theory is “mired in a fictional past and envisions a utopian future”). 
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der certain circumstances, larger groups are more likely to find the 
right answer to tough questions.27  But Condorcet’s “Jury Theorem” 
only applies in certain circumstances.  It provides a compelling rea-
son to defer to legislative enactments, but only when its preconditions 
are met.28  Thus, the Jury Theorem provides both a potential justifica-
tion for the idea of a super-statute and the means for setting some 
guidelines on what a super-statute is. 
1. Condorcet’s Requirements 
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is a mathematical proof, not a socio-
logical observation.  It shows that when a large number of people 
provide answers to a common question, even if each answer is only 
slightly more likely to be right than wrong, the chances that a majori-
ty of predictions will be correct approaches 100% as the number of 
predictions rises.29  Legal scholars have applied Condorcet’s insight to 
democratic decision-making.30  If groups make better decisions than 
even expert individuals, democracy—a mechanism for letting groups 
make decisions—should be more likely than other systems to get the 
right answer to tough questions.  The conclusion seems to flow natu-
rally from the premise, but the devil is in the details.  According to 
the original Jury Theorem, crowds are wise only when three condi-
tions are met:  the question being asked has right and wrong answers; 
the members of the group answering it are, on average, more likely to 
be right than to be wrong; and the answers of individual group mem-
bers are independent of each other.31 
 
 27 See generally Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of 
Decision-Making (1785) in CONDORCET:  SELECTED WRITINGS 33–70 (Keith Michael Baker 
ed., 1976). 
 28 Id. at 61–63. 
 29 Id. at 48–49 (“One finds further that if the probable truth of the vote of each voter is 
greater than 1/2, that is to say if it is more probable than not that he will decide in con-
formity with the truth, the more the number of voters increases, the greater the probabil-
ity of the truth of the decision.  The limit of this probability will be certainty . . . .”). 
 30 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS:  WHY THE FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 8–10 (2009); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW 
AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 25–33 (2009) (examining Condorcet’s Jury Theorem). 
 31 Condorcet articulated several other limitations on the Jury Theorem, but they are either 
not relevant to this discussion or they have been rejected by later scholars.  See Bernard 
Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 268–
269 (1983) (explaining that group members need not be homogenous); Christian List & 
Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy:  Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. 
PHIL. 277, 284 (2001) (explaining that the Jury Theorem applies even when voters 
choose from more than two options).  For an argument that the Jury Theorem will have 
limited applicability in real world conditions, see VERMEULE, supra note 30. 
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2. What Is the Question? 
Technically, the Jury Theorem only shows that crowds will be like-
ly to produce right answers to questions of fact for which answers can 
be correct or incorrect.32  But, from the perspective of democratic de-
cision-making, it should not matter whether a group is answering a 
fact question or an opinion question.  Imagine the country is asked to 
vote on whether or not to allow the death penalty.  Some voters will 
interpret this question as one of means-ends rationality and ask which 
policy will best maximize positive outcomes, like public safety, and 
minimize negative outcomes, like expense.  Others will take a more 
Kantian approach and simply ask which outcome is consistent with 
the dictates of justice.  Within each group, the Jury Theorem should 
hold, since each group is answering a question about the fit between 
an agreed-upon set of values or goals and a particular policy.  This is 
the kind of question susceptible to right answers.  As a result, a major-
ity of voters will reliably support the policy most conducive to achiev-
ing the majority’s goals.  If most Americans are utilitarians and abol-
ishing the death penalty maximizes overall utility, a majority will 
support abolition.33 
Of course, voters will also be implicitly choosing between two 
frames for answering the general question:  utilitarian and Kantian.  
This decision may not have a right answer in the traditional sense.  
But, one could still feel that it is exactly the kind of question that 
should be committed to democratic majorities.  Normative questions 
that cannot be settled by reasoning from shared values must be set-
tled somehow, and majority rule is at least as appropriate as any other 
approach. 
The Jury Theorem tells us that each group—utilitarian and Kanti-
an—is more likely to find a policy that achieves its ends by submitting 
the question to democratic decision-making.  Democratic principles 
 
 32 See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 38. 
 33 For a mathematical proof of this, see Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democ-
racy:  Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in 2 INFORMATION 
POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 177–83 (Bernard Grofman & 
Guillermo Owen eds., 1986).  This result can be expected except where the majority 
group is not much larger than the minority group and is significantly worse at calculating 
the best policies for achieving its ends.  Id. at 178–79.  Even in this situation, to the extent 
that the majority group displays less competence because it cares less about a particular 
issue, the democratic process might be said to succeed even when it produces an out-
come that does not reflect the best means of achieving the majority’s goals.  Id. at 182–83.  
Seeing no evidence that the NLRA provides an example of this limit on the Jury Theo-
rem’s logic, I ignore this limit here. 
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say that the best way to decide which goals to pursue—when underly-
ing values do not provide an answer—is to submit the question to ma-
jority rule.34  Democracy is thus a dominant strategy even when 
groups face policy questions that cannot be clearly reduced to ques-
tions of fact.35 
3. Average Likeliness of Being Correct 
For the Jury Theorem to hold true, the average member of a 
group must do a better job of getting a question right than random 
chance.36  This seems like a low bar.  Individuals would almost have to 
consciously avoid the right answer in order to be less accurate than 
random chance.37  But, group members might be consistently wrong 
in two situations:  when they are subject to group biases and when 
they face questions about which they have no information.38  This 
suggests the first limitation on the super-statute theory.  To the extent 
that statutes appear to be the product of systematic biases or to cover 
topics on which individuals have no expertise, they should not be 
considered super-statutes. 
4. Independence of Opinions 
Finally, the Jury Theorem presupposes that voters’ preferences are 
independent.  But, it is unclear both what type of independence is 
necessary and how well the Theorem stands up in situations of less 
than perfect independence.39  If the Theorem required that each vot-
er be completely uninfluenced by any other voter, it would have little 
 
 34 Here, this Article ignores a number of obvious problems with majority rule.  They will be 
discussed below. 
 35 Sunstein elides the fact/opinion distinction by pointing out that many questions of mo-
rality can be said to have better and worse answers.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:  
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1044 (2005).  
Condorcet also believed that moral questions should be seen as having right and wrong 
answers.  Condorcet, supra note 27, at 33–34.  Whether or not this is true, the Jury Theo-
rem may still apply to questions of policy that combine questions that have right and 
wrong answers with questions that do not. 
 36 Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56–57, 60–61.  The theorem was initially interpreted as re-
quiring every citizen be more likely than random chance to get the right answer.  Modern 
theorists have made clear that the wisdom of a given crowd depends on its average mem-
ber.  See Grofman et al., supra note 31, at 268–69 (emphasizing the importance of juror 
competence in driving correct verdicts). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56–57, 60–61 (listing the required conditions to secure 
these two essential conditions); Sunstein, supra note 35, at 975–76. 
 39 See VERMEULE, supra note 30, at 30 (finding it unclear “whether, and to what extent, in-
dependence is compromised by the common deliberation or discussion”). 
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to say about contemporary democracy.  Few voters are likely to go to 
the polls without having been swayed by at least one other voter. 
Fortunately, a modified version of the Theorem can be justified 
even if voters do not have completely independent preferences.40  
When opinion leaders are divided on a policy question, large groups 
will be likely to get the question right, even if many of them blindly 
follow a given leader on most issues.41  This is even truer when there 
are numerous opinion leaders and when leaders do not succeed in 
swaying their flock to a particular position.42  Thus, a statute passed 
during a contentious time, when citizens cannot get a clear signal 
from a single opinion leader, will be more likely to reflect correct an-
swers to policy questions.   
C. The Incentives Rationale 
Deference to super-statutes may also facilitate citizen participation 
and system stability and responsiveness.  Citizens decide whether to 
engage in collective action in part based on whether they think of 
themselves or their group as politically efficacious.43  And, citizens are 
more likely to feel politically efficacious if they have experienced po-
litical successes in the past.44  If citizens mobilize and achieve a legisla-
 
 40 See, e.g., Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises, 29 
ECON. & PHIL. 87, 87 (2013) (proving that “large crowds are fallible but better than small 
groups”). 
 41 Robert E. Goodin & Kai Spiekerman, Courts of Many Minds, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 555, 570 
(2012) (discussing the impact of opinion leaders on group decisions). 
 42 Id.  
 43 In the words of an early and influential statement of this thesis, “the self-confident citizen 
is likely to be the active citizen.” GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC 
CULTURE:  POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 206 (1989).  Almond 
and Verba’s insight has been confirmed repeatedly.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Karp & Susan A. 
Banducci, Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies:  How Electoral Sys-
tems Shape Political Behaviour, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 326–28 (2008) (Eng.) (analyzing 
the relationship between efficacy and voter participation). 
 44 Albert Bandura, a psychologist, has demonstrated that past successes exert a powerful 
influence on individual and collective self-efficacy, even leading diagnosed phobics to 
overcome deep-seated fears about particular activities.  See Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy 
Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 122, 126, 137 (1982) (“That perceived self-
efficacy operates as a cognitive mechanism by which controllability reduces fear arous-
al.”).  Other scholars have taken Bandura’s insights and tested the impact of political suc-
cesses and failures on feelings of self-efficacy.  Douglas Madsen finds that Indians who 
had successfully petitioned their government for assistance had higher feelings of self-
efficacy.  Douglas Madsen, Political Self-Efficacy Tested, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 571, 577 
(1987) (“The successful petitioners typically show a sense of self-efficacy that is well above 
the norm . . . .”).  Similarly, Christopher J. Anderson and Andrew J. LoTempio find that 
Americans who vote for losing presidential candidates have less trust in the political sys-
tem than those who vote for winners.  See Christopher J. Anderson & Andrew J. LoTem-
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tive outcome only to find their achievement whittled away by the 
courts, their feeling of collective efficacy will rationally diminish.  The 
impact may be worse than if a mobilized group never succeeded in 
changing the law.45  When citizens do not get the votes in Congress to 
pass their proposals, they may be inclined to try harder next time 
with more allies and a better legislative strategy.  When citizens feel 
their political achievements have been demolished by politically un-
accountable actors, they have no reason to try again in the political 
realm.46 
Even those who do not have any special attachment to political 
mobilization as such can support a model that rewards mobilized citi-
zens by treating their legislative accomplishments as presumptively 
privileged.  Those with the political commitment to mobilize in the 
first place may be dangerous if their efforts cannot be integrated into 
the political order.47  To the extent that they continue to express their 
political preferences within the system, they are more likely to accept 
the system as legitimate.48  Thus, encouraging political action within 
established lawmaking procedures not only makes the political system 
more responsive, it makes it more stable.49 
 
pio, Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America, 32 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 335, 341–44 (2002) 
(Eng.). 
 45 Bandura finds that individuals experience a greater decline in feelings of self-efficacy in 
response to failures when they feel that their failures were not caused by a lack of effort.  
Bandura, supra note 44, at 126.  His finding corresponds with common sense.  If individ-
uals believe that they can succeed by trying harder, they are less likely to take their fail-
ures as a reason to quit. 
 46 This may sound like an argument against any kind of judicial review, but it is not.  It 
merely recognizes that judicial review is likely to have a more significant de-mobilizing ef-
fect when it acts on legislation that was the product of popular deliberation.  Of course, 
this de-mobilizing impact must still be weighed against other values, like the importance 
of upholding constitutional principles and protecting minorities. 
 47 Evidence from other countries suggests that those with low levels of trust in the govern-
ment and a general perception that they cannot have an impact on government policy 
are the most likely to engage in disruptive political activity.  See Mitchell A. Seligson, Trust, 
Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation:  A Study of Costa Rican Peasants, 10 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 75, 97–98 (1980) (Eng.) (“Third World peasants with low trust in government are the 
ones most likely to become involved in mobilized political participation.”). 
 48 It is fairly intuitive that those who place more trust in the political system will participate 
more.  Studies also indicate that the act of participation increases trust, producing a vir-
tuous circle from the perspective of both participation and system stability.  See Steven E. 
Finkel, Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy:  A Panel Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 891, 908–909 (1985); see also Richard Nadeau & André Blais, Accepting the Election Out-
come:  The Effect of Participation on Losers’ Consent 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 553, 560–61 (1993) 
(Eng.) (showing that opponents of a new political administration are more likely to view 
the administration as legitimate if they voted in the election that put it in power).  
 49 Writing during a time of intense political volatility, Arthur H. Miller documented a wide-
spread feeling of political inefficacy and cynicism and concluded that America faced a se-
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D. A Normatively Defensible Definition of Super-statutes 
With three justifications for treating super-statutes with special 
deference identified, it is worth revisiting the definition of super-
statutes.  Eskridge and Ferejohn’s definition came mostly from their 
analysis of the types of laws that courts already pay special respect.  
Since this Article does not rely on general practice as a reason for de-
ferring to super-statutes, it must identify a set of statutes that fit with 
the normative justifications discussed above.  This dictates a slightly 
different definition of “super-statute” than the definition offered by 
Eskridge and Ferejohn and provides a principled means for deter-
mining which laws are super-statutes and which are not. 
First, super-statutes must have been passed during a period in 
which citizens had some opportunity to express disapproval of 
them—and to block them if desired—either before passage or shortly 
after.  In a functioning democracy, citizens can be said to have input 
on legislation in two ways.50  They may have the ability to influence 
their lawmakers by indicating that they will be less likely to support 
the reelection of any official who supports a given proposal.  This 
mechanism depends on the salience of the statute at issue.  To the 
extent that elected officials believe they could lose votes based on one 
position on one bill, they will tend to reflect the voters’ wishes on that 
bill, and voters can be said to have effectively participated in the bill’s 
passage or rejection.51  Voters may also determine whether a bill pass-
 
rious risk of politically motivated violence and instability.  See Arthur H. Miller, Political Is-
sues and Trust in Government:  1964–1970, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 951, 970–72 (1974).  More 
recently, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn have asserted that “groups told they have no 
prospect of prevailing in political deliberation become radicalized and may drop out of 
normal politics” and concluded that “[d]eliberation-ending judicial review is a danger to 
democracy itself.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture:  
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1285 (2009).  Even if political 
cynicism does not reach the point where it can undermine regime stability, it may none-
theless make effective governance more difficult.  Citizens who feel that they have little 
ability to influence their government are less likely to comply with the law or to engage in 
allegiant behaviors, such as jury service.  See PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT:  CRITICAL 
CITIZENS REVISITED 226–27 (2011). 
 50 The options are borrowed from Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influ-
ence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 50–51 (1963).  The analysis that follows is my 
own. 
 51 The importance of issue salience as a predictor of lawmaker responsiveness to constituent 
demands was first suggested in a seminal study by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes 
in 1963.  Id. at 51–53.  Subsequent studies have provided more direct evidence of the im-
portance of salience.  See James H. Kuklinski & Donald J. McCrone, Policy Salience and the 
Causal Structure of Representation, 8 AM. POL. RES. 139, 151–54 (1980) (showing that repre-
sentatives are more likely to reflect their constituents’ preferences in roll call votes when 
the representatives believe their constituents are focused on the issue in question); Jeffrey 
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es by electing the representatives who vote directly on the bill.  For 
this mechanism to be relevant, a particular legislative proposal must 
be salient during an election, such that the election’s victors may 
claim a mandate to pass that proposal.52 
These criteria for identifying super-statutes are dictated by each of 
the normative justifications, discussed above, for treating super-
statutes with special deference.  A statute cannot be said to reflect the 
will of the people if the people had no way of weighing in on its pas-
sage.  It is unlikely to take advantage of the people’s wisdom if law-
makers had no reason to take the people’s input into account.  And, 
treating it with special deference will not encourage political partici-
pation if the statute is not the product of public participation in the 
first place.  Thus, the normative arguments in favor of super-statutes 
apply only if super-statutes are defined to exclude laws that are not 
the product of public input. 
Second, super-statutes must pass during a period when voters 
would have access to information regarding their substance and likely 
impact.  In part, this requirement simply reflects the fact that if citi-
zens have little information regarding a statute prior to its passage, 
they will not be able to effectively communicate their position on the 
proposal to their representatives, and it cannot be said that those 
representatives reflected the collective wisdom that Condorcet 
showed to be so powerful.53  The information requirement also re-
flects the conditions under which the Jury Theorem would predict 
that public input will lead to better policy.  When more information 
is available regarding a proposal, the average citizen is more likely to 
correctly determine the proposal’s chances of having a positive im-
pact.54  However, this requirement should not be overplayed.  Provid-
ed that citizens have enough information to make their predictions 
more likely to be correct than predictions made at random, citizen 
input will tend to produce the right answer to policy questions.55 
 
R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States:  Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 
103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367, 376–80 (2009) (showing increased responsiveness on issues 
heavily covered in the press). 
 52 For example, during the 2012 election, President Obama highlighted his intention to 
raise taxes on high earners, allowing him to claim a mandate after his victory.  See Helene 
Cooper & Jonathan Weisman, Obama to Insist on Tax Increases for the Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2012, at A1. 
 53  See supra Part I.B.3. 
 54  See Condorcet, supra note 27, at 56 (“It is necessary, furthermore, that voters be enlight-
ened . . . .”) 
 55 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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Third, for the Jury Theorem to apply, a super-statute must emerge 
from a period when multiple views are expressed, and expressed ef-
fectively, regarding the statute’s value.56  The Jury Theorem requires 
that individual opinions be independent, at least to some extent.  
This requirement is not met when one opinion leader dominates 
public opinion or all opinion leaders agree about a particular policy.57 
II.  THE PASSAGE OF THE NLRA 
Part I presented three justifications for treating certain statutes 
with special deference.  Since these justifications only apply to stat-
utes with certain characteristics, they can be used to derive three pre-
requisites for a statute to be considered a super-statute.  First, a super-
statute must pass when voters have information regarding the legisla-
tion.  Second, it must be a high-salience piece of legislation.  And 
third, it must divide opinion leaders such that popular support for 
the bill cannot be explained simply as citizens being corralled into 
supporting a decision made by a relative few.  This Part will show that 
the NLRA has these prerequisites. 
A. Information 
By the time the NLRA was signed in July of 1935, voters would 
have had plenty of information on the new law.  From the beginning 
of the 1935 congressional session to when Roosevelt signed the Act 
on July 5, the New York Times discussed the Act in 258 articles.58  Fifty 
of those articles appeared on the front page.  Other large publica-
tions printed between ninety-three and 146 articles, with sixteen to 
fifty-six appearing on the front page.59  Press coverage focused on 
 
 56    See supra Part I.B.4. 
 57  See supra Part I.B.4. 
 58 To come up with this number, I searched for all New York Times articles containing the 
word “Wagner” and the word “labor.”  If the headline did not make it clear that the arti-
cle discussed the proposed NLRA, I scanned the article.  Any article that mentioned the 
proposal, even if it focused on other subjects, was counted.  I excluded articles that mere-
ly announced events related to the Act.  Wagner also proposed labor reform legislation—
identical in most respects to the NLRA—in 1934.  In the period between Wagner’s first 
introduction of the bill and the 1934 election, the New York Times discussed the proposal 
in 128 articles, including twenty-four on the front page.  To come up with this number, I 
searched ProQuest for Times articles from the beginning of 1934 to November 4, 1934, 
containing the following terms (each of which the Times, at one point, used as the unoffi-
cial title of Wagner’s bill):  “labor disputes bill,” “Wagner labor,” and “labor board bill.” 
 59 The Washington Post printed 136, with fifty-six on the front page.  The Los Angeles Times 
printed ninety-three with sixteen on the front page.  And, the Chicago Daily Tribune print-
ed 146 with twenty-eight on the front page.  I chose these papers because they all had 
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three elements of the proposed law.  First, the law replaced the early 
New Deal’s ad hoc arbitration system with a unified national board 
for settling most labor disputes.  Second, the law established the 
principle that a majority in a given bargaining unit can elect a repre-
sentative for the entire unit.  And finally, the law banned what Sena-
tor Robert Wagner, the legislation’s sponsor, called “company-
dominated unions.”60  Americans who had been following the evolu-
tion of labor law in the early New Deal period would have recognized 
these provisions as answers to three of the most hotly—and publicly—
contested policy questions of the time. 
1. Centralized Administration 
When the NLRA was introduced, Americans had seen how a de-
centralized system for adjudicating labor disputes worked in practice, 
and they had seen the impact of several attempts to insert greater 
centralization into the system.  The Roosevelt Administration’s first 
attempt to change U.S. labor policy seemed to rely on decentralized 
enforcement.  Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(“NIRA”) did not establish a mechanism for enforcing its own labor 
protections.  Its language, similar to language contained in the pre-
amble to the Norris-La Guardia Act, signed into law in 1932,61 could 
 
large circulations and represented four different areas of the country.  Others have 
looked to these publications as presenting different political viewpoints today, and they 
appear to have had different perspectives during the New Deal.  See, e.g., Todd A. Collins 
& Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions:  To-
ward a New Measure, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1 (2011), http://prq.sagepub.com/content/ early/
2011/03/07/1065912911398047.  While all four opposed the NLRA, the New York Times 
and the Washington Post generally backed Roosevelt and the New Deal.  The Los Angeles 
Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune did not. 
 60 By the term, Wagner meant all unions funded, created, or controlled by employers, in-
cluding those that allowed substantial amounts of worker participation.  See National La-
bor Relations Act § 8(a)(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(2)(5) (2006)).  See also Green Asks 
Labor to Confer on Drive for Wagner Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1935, at 1; Here Are Provisions of 
Wagner-Connery Labor Disputes Bill, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jun. 20, 1935, at 8; President Orders 
Speed on NRA and Wagner Bills; For Latter ‘In Principle,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1935, at 1.  
While the law evolved in several respects as it moved through Congress, these provisions 
remained the core of the proposal.  Wagner Introduces Labor Bill Seeking Company Union 
Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1; Wagner’s Labor Bill Goes Through House, L.A. TIMES, 
June 20, 1935, at 1. 
 61 Compare National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195 (1933) 
(“[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or co-
ercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or 
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection; [and] (2) that no employee and no one seeking 
employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union 
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be seen as directed at the courts, just as the Norris-LaGuardia Act had 
been directed at the courts.  On the other hand, Section 7(a)’s inclu-
sion in the NIRA suggested that it would be enforced by the National 
Recovery Administration (“NRA”) through the NRA’s network of lo-
cal and industry boards. 
President Roosevelt, however, seemed to have other plans.  On 
August 5, 1933, Roosevelt created what would become known as the 
National Labor Board (“NLB”).  In hindsight, the move appears to be 
a first step toward the creation of a process for labor law adjudication.  
At the time, however, it was unclear what Roosevelt intended the NLB 
to do.  Roosevelt’s statement creating the NLB contained no details 
regarding its authority, nor was it accompanied by an executive order 
authorizing the Board.62 
Even the Board’s title—one of the few indicators of its status and 
mission—was initially unclear.  It was originally called the “National 
Industrial Recovery Adjustment Board,”63 then the “National Board of 
Arbitration,”64 and then the “National Mediation Board.”65  It quickly 
became the “National Labor Board,”66 and the name stuck.  The shifts 
in name reflect fluidity in thinking about the new board.  A “board of 
arbitration” would be expected to help parties negotiate settlements.  
The NLB, on the other hand, could, in theory, do much more.  The 
vagueness of the title—in contrast to the original title’s specificity—
suggested the possibility of expanding the Board’s mission.  Nobody 
knew where this would lead.  As one press report put it, “[w]hat final 
 
or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choos-
ing.”) with Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
102 (2006)) (“[I]t is necessary that [the employee] have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”). 
 62 See The President’s Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 1.  The Board would not receive 
official authorization until four months later, after its role as a key player in labor adjudi-
cation had already been established.  See Roosevelt Order Backs Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 1933, at 1. 
 63 Form Industrial Board:  NRA Establishes Group to End All Industrial Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
5, 1933, at 2. 
 64 Announcement on Peace Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 2; Mediation Board Will Cov-
er Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1933, at 3. 
 65 NRA Gives Warning on Racketeering in Recovery Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1933, at 1. 
 66 Federation Held Near for Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1933, at 6. 
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and permanent form this mediation plan will take is not predicted, 
and President Roosevelt himself has no set design.”67 
Whatever Roosevelt’s intent, the Board quickly began to play a 
prominent role in resolving labor disputes and developing principles 
of labor law.68  Within two weeks of its creation, the NLB had settled a 
coal strike,69 a hosiery strike involving 15,000 workers,70 and two 
strikes in shirt factories.71  In the process, it developed a strategy for 
settling disputes that went beyond facilitating private bargains, to 
guaranteeing certain labor rights.72  With the Board continuing to 
show signs of success,73 it began to develop a system whereby it would 
act as something like a supreme court, resolving disputes that could 
not be resolved by a system of regional labor boards, local NRA 
boards, or the Labor Department’s conciliation service.74  Finally, af-
ter Senator Wagner threatened to resign as NLB chair, the Board se-
cured sole jurisdiction over the nation’s labor disputes.  It developed 
a plan to have NLB-supervised regional labor boards, rather than lo-
cal NRA compliance bodies, serve as first-level adjudicators in all la-
bor disputes.75  When it took over the responsibilities of New York 
City’s busy labor board on September 29, 1933,76 the Board appeared 
to be achieving its goals.77 
Over the next year and a half, Americans watched the NLB try, 
with varying degrees of success, to establish itself as the central regu-
lator of American labor relations.  In October of 1933, the Weirton 
Steel Corporation declared that it was not bound by an NLB order to 
 
 67 Roosevelt Appoints Board of 7 to Decide All Disputes Over Industrial Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
1933, at 1. 
 68 Union Labor Wins Victory Under NRA, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1933, at 1. 
 69 Mediators End Coal Walkout; 2 More Tackled, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1933, at 3. 
 70 J. Bernard McDonnell, 15,000 End Strike; New Board Scores, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1933, at 
1. 
 71 Labor Board Settles Two Shirt Strikes; Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 1933, at 1. 
 72 See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 59 (1950). 
 73 The Board continued to settle and avoid strikes.  See 4,000 Garment Workers Return to Jobs 
Today, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1933 at 7; Cleveland Car Strike Averted, WASH. POST, Sept. 
11, 1933, at 11; Film Strike Ended by Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1933, at 6; Labor Board 
Averts Strike By Air Pilots, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1933, at 5; Labor Board Settles Strike, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1933, at 6; Silk Strike Ended by Wagner Board, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1933, at 3.  
It also began to establish procedures for determining union representation without 
strikes.  See Louis Stark, NRA Gives Labor Right to Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1933, at 4. 
 74 Labor Board Adopts “Last Resort” Policy, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1933, at 2. 
 75 Labor Board Plans Regional Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1933, at 7; Regional Bodies to End 
Strikes:  N.R.A. Agencies Plan of National Labor Board:  Johnson Wants End of Wordy Warfare or 
Resignations, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1933, at 13. 
 76 See 130 Strikes Ended by NRA in 3 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1933, at 1. 
 77 Wagner to Absorb Whalen NRA Board on Labor Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1933, at 1. 
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which it had not consented.  The Board fought back in the newspa-
pers and within the Administration, eventually winning Roosevelt’s 
support and, apparently, the power to enforce its will.78  But, the 
Weirton fight did not establish a centralized system for adjudicating 
labor disputes once and for all.  In 1935—after replacing the NLB 
with a tribunal (called the NLRB) which was intended to have more 
authority79—the Roosevelt Administration backed the NRA against 
the new NLRB in a highly public battle for jurisdiction over a labor 
dispute in the newspaper industry.80  As the labor boards’ achieve-
ments and reversals played out on the front pages of the nation’s 
newspapers, Americans had a chance to develop informed opinions 
about the desirability of a centralized labor board.  By the time Sena-
tor Wagner’s NLRA proposal came to the public’s attention, the pub-
lic had seen how labor disputes go when a central board can impose a 
solution and how they go when it cannot. 
2. Majority Rule 
Prior to 1933, unions gained the right to bargain by bringing to 
bear enough economic power that employers decided bargaining was 
in their interests.  The NIRA set out to make collective bargaining a 
matter of legal right, not economic force, and this raised key ques-
tions.  If unions were no longer going to gain the right to speak for 
workers by coercing employers into sitting down at the bargaining ta-
ble, somebody would need to decide how unions gained the right to 
speak and for whom they could speak.  Two potential answers to the-
se questions were considered.  On the one hand, unions could be 
seen as speaking for an entire workplace, provided that they had won 
the support of a majority of that workplace.  On the other, unions 
could be seen as speaking only for their members, with a workplace 
minority able to make its own bargain with management.  Since nei-
ther the NIRA nor America’s past experience with labor relations dic-
tated an approach to this question, Americans watched as one set of 
federal officials pursued a policy of majority rule while another did 
not. 
The pre-NLRA NLRB stuck to the principle of majority rule.  In 
the Denver Tramway case, decided March 1, 1934, an independent un-
 
 78 Coal Men Defy NRA on Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1933, at 5. 
 79 The National Labor Board became the National Labor Relations Board on June 30, 1934, 
pursuant to Public Resolution 44 and a Roosevelt executive order.  Text of Order Establish-
ing New Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1934, at 20. 
 80 See Roosevelt Curbs NLRB in Code Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1935, at 1. 
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ion that had won a majority of votes cast in a union election sought 
the right to represent the entire bargaining unit.81  The NLB sided 
with the union.  It reaffirmed this approach six months later, when it 
ruled that the Houde Engineering Company had to grant a closed 
shop to the United Auto Workers union after it won an NLRB elec-
tion.82 
The Roosevelt Administration took a different approach.  After is-
suing an executive order endorsing majority rule,83 the Administra-
tion quickly back-tracked.  The day after Executive Order 6580 was 
issued, Donald Richberg and Hugh Johnson, the Administration’s 
highest-profile labor advisers, declared that the order allowed indi-
viduals who had not voted for a union to bargain individually even af-
ter a union had won an election.84  Richberg and Johnson’s position 
got official presidential backing on March 26—less than two months 
after the introduction of Executive Order 6580—when the President 
negotiated a truce to avert an auto industry strike.  The truce called 
for a union election in the industry, but without majority rule.  Each 
union participating in the election would be represented proportion-
ally.85  Employers greeted the President’s new policy with jubilation.  
Labor leaders saw it as a betrayal.86 
As he made the case for labor law reform, Wagner dramatized the 
difference between the pluralist approach promoted by the Admin-
istration and his goal of majority rule.87  Americans considering the 
Wagner Act thus had two clear choices defended by prominent and 
popular leaders and reflected in concrete policy decisions.  They 
 
 81 In re Denver Tramway Corp., 1 N.L.B. 64 (1934).  It had not, however, won a majority of 
potential voters.  BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 60; CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT 
WORK:  RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 36 (2005). 
 82 In re Houde Eng’g Corp, 1 N.L.B. 87 (1934); Majority to Hold Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 
1934, at 1.  The Houde decision also imposed a duty to bargain in good faith on the em-
ployer, another labor law innovation that would be enshrined in the NLRA.  See National 
Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006)). 
 83 Exec. Order No. 6580 (Feb. 1, 1934), reprinted in DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR BOARD I:  
AUGUST 1933–MARCH 1934 vii (1934). 
 84 Louis Stark, NRA Denies Slur at Company Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1934, at 25. 
 85 G. William Domhoff, THE POWER ELITE AND THE STATE:  HOW POLICY IS MADE IN AMERICA 
89 (1990).  
 86 The President’s shift on majority rule may have confused organized labor.  The AFL ini-
tially backed the President’s truce, with AFL President William Green calling it a “great 
step forward for labor.”  Louis Stark, Roosevelt Averts Strike; Auto Workers and Makers Hail 
Wage Bargaining Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1934, at 1.  Just two days later, the New York 
Times announced that the auto truce was seen as a blow to organized labor in general and 
to the AFL in particular.  Louis Stark, A.F. of L. Setback is Seen in Capital in Auto Agreement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1934, at 1.  It is not clear what caused the shift in coverage. 
 87 Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for Majority Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1. 
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could choose majority rule as it had been practiced in the Denver 
Tramway and Houde decisions, or they could choose the pluralist ap-
proach articulated by Johnson and Richberg and reflected in the 
President’s auto settlement.88  Both approaches had received exten-
sive media attention.  And, both Wagner and his opponents made 
clear that the debate over the NLRA represented a choice between 
the two.89 
3. Company Unions 
The NLRA’s provision outlawing company unions90 settled an on-
going debate between three positions.  Unions and their backers took 
the position that company-dominated unions—those that were creat-
ed and financed by employers—were inherently unrepresentative.  
These unions distracted employees from real collective empower-
ment and should be fought.91 
Roosevelt Administration officials occasionally seemed sympathet-
ic to this view,92 but the mainstream Administration position was more 
moderate.  According to the Administration, workers could join a 
 
 88 The Roosevelt Administration’s position never created a completely clear contrast with 
the NLRB approach because the Administration never took a clear position.  Even after 
the auto settlement, the NRA stripped Houde of its Blue Eagle for failing to comply with 
an NLRB order based on the principle of majority rule.  And, even as the NRA backed 
the NLRB in the Houde case, it allowed another company in a similar situation to ignore 
the majority view among its workers.  Both Houde and the press noticed and objected to 
the inconsistency.  Edwin J. Lebherze, Editorial Correspondence, NRA Rulings Vary Widely 
in Buffalo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1934, at E7. 
 89 Harriman Opposes the Wagner Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1935, at 9. 
 90 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2) (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(2) (2006)).  The debate over “company unions” suffered from inconsistencies in 
terminology.  In the early 1930s, the term “company union” could mean simply a union 
that was confined to one company and not affiliated with an outside union.  Thus, Wag-
ner could say that the NLRA did not ban company unions.  See Louis Stark, Wagner Propos-
es New Labor Board to Top All Others, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1.  However, “company 
union” could also mean a union dominated by a particular employer.  Adopting this def-
inition, the press frequently referred to the NLRA as an effort to ban company unions.  
See, e.g., Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for Majority Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1.  The confusion allowed officials of all stripes to avoid mak-
ing clear their position on company-dominated unions. 
 91 See Holds Threats Bar Labor’s Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1933, at 11; Recovery Plan at 
Stake:  Workers Give Notice They Will Battle to Last for Bargaining Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
1933, at 1 [hereinafter Recovery Plan at Stake]; Louis Stark, Labor Clash Nears on Code Provi-
sions, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1933, at 11.  For a discussion of several reasons for opposition to 
company unions, see Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act:  Power, Sym-
bol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1442–61 (1993). 
 92 See Coal Strike Ended on Roosevelt Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1933, at 4; Recovery Plan at Stake, 
supra note 91. 
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company union, an independent union, or no union at all, as long as 
the decision was not coerced.93  The NLB reflected this approach.  It 
invalidated employer-controlled company unions that were imposed 
on workers against their will94 and declared that employers could not 
refuse to bargain with an independent union simply by claiming its 
workers preferred a company union.95  But, the NLB allowed compa-
ny unions to compete in free elections.96 
The final approach came from the courts.  The setting was the 
high-profile case of the Weirton Steel Corporation.  Weirton claimed 
that its employees preferred to be represented by a company union—
a claim buttressed by the results of a company-run election—and re-
fused the NLB’s demand to run its own election at the company.97  As 
Weirton defied the Board, General Hugh Johnson of the NRA de-
clared war on the company, stripping it of its Blue Eagle98 and refer-
ring the case to the Attorney General for prosecution.99  Labor cele-
brated as the Administration made clear that companies could not 
avoid bargaining with an independent union simply by staging an 
election to be won by an employer-controlled union. 
But, the moment was short-lived.  Shortly before Congress began 
to act on the NLRA, the judiciary weighed in on the Weirton case.  A 
federal district court in Delaware ruled that Weirton did not exercise 
illegal control over a union, even when the company created the un-
ion unilaterally and paid its officers and expenses.100  The court re-
jected the “old world theory” of an “inevitable and necessary diversity 
of interest” between employer and employee.101  As long as companies 
did not directly coerce employees’ choice of representative, the court 
held, company unions did not violate the NLRA.102 
 
 93 Auto Code Signed for 35-Hour Week; Ford Waits to Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1933, at 1. 
 94 BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 60–61 (citing In re Nat’l Lock Co., 1 N.L.B. 15 (1934), In re 
Fed. Knitting Mills, 1 N.L.B. 69 (1934), and HARRY A. MILLS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, 
ORGANIZED LABOR 845 (1945)).  
 95 See MILLS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 94, at 843 n.1 (cataloging several examples of NLB 
decisions invalidating company unions). 
 96 Id. at 845–47. 
 97 Coal Men Defy NRA on Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1933, at 5; Company Unions Defy Labor 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1933, at 36. 
 98 The Blue Eagle is the emblem that was granted to companies that cooperated with the 
NRA.  Removal of the Blue Eagle was seen as a government invitation to boycott the tar-
geted business.  Eagle Forfeit Follows Ouster of Union Men, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1933, at 9. 
 99 Labor Heads Call Weir Vote a ‘Joke,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1933, at 3. 
100 United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 10 F. Supp. 55, 61, 84 (D. Del. 1935). 
101 Id. at 86. 
102 Id.  The court’s hostility to the government position can be seen by the way it decided the 
case.  After holding against the government on the company union question, it went on 
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Thus, when voters began to see extensive coverage of the NLRA’s 
provisions banning company unions, they had already seen what an 
anti-company union policy could look like.  They had seen the Ad-
ministration criticize company unions and go to court to challenge 
them.  And, they had seen the limits of existing law in terms of its 
ability to stop employers from creating their own unions and impos-
ing them on their workers.103  Even on this relatively technical point 
of labor law, Americans had an unusual amount of information avail-
able to help shape their opinions. 
B. Salience 
Americans rarely vote directly on federal policies, but when an is-
sue is particularly salient, the people’s representatives generally do a 
good job of reflecting popular sentiments.104  No opinion polls exist 
to directly measure the salience of the NLRA in 1935, but an analysis 
of newspaper coverage suggests that the Act was extremely salient 
when it passed. 
Todd A. Collins and Christopher A. Cooper have developed a 
method for evaluating issue salience by examining press coverage af-
ter a particular decision is made.105  They propose analyzing press 
 
to find the NLRA unconstitutional as applied to Weirton, a manufacturer who engaged in 
interstate commerce only as a subsidiary of the National Steel Company.  Id. at 90. 
103 It is worth noting that both the administration’s criticisms of company unions and the 
district court’s rejection of those criticisms made front page news across the country.  See 
supra note 92–93; Company Union Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Government Loses 
Test of N.R.A. in Weirton Steel Suit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Johnson Warns Weirton 
Steel May Lose Eagle, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 15, 1933, at 1; New Deal Loses Weirton Steel In-
junction Suit, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; NRA’s Section 7-a is Ruled Illegal in Weir-
ton Case, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 28, 1935, at 1; Power is Given to Labor Board, ATLANTA 
CONST., Dec. 20, 1933, at 1; Steel Head Unyielding, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1933, at 1. 
104 See supra note 51. 
105 See Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme 
Court Decisions:  Toward a New Measure, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 1–12 (2011), available at 
http://prq.sagepub.com/content/ early/2011/03/07/1065912911398047.  Collins and 
Cooper updated a measure proposed by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal to measure the 
salience of judicial opinions.  See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 
44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 66–83 (2000).  While Epstein and Segal’s measure is binary—issues 
are either salient or not—and focuses on only the front page of only one publication—
the New York Times—Collins and Cooper have developed a measure that allows for com-
parisons across issues and takes into consideration coverage in multiple papers.  Collins & 
Cooper, supra at 1–3.  While the measure was developed to evaluate judicial decisions, it 
can be used to measure salience in any situation where opinion polling is unavailable or 
unhelpful.  See Epstein & Segal, supra at 79–80.  There are compelling reasons to think 
newspaper coverage would correlate with issue salience among the general public.  
Newspapers interested in keeping customers are likely to disproportionately cover issues 
in which their readers are interested.  And newspaper coverage may in turn increase issue 
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coverage the day after the decision in four geographically and ideo-
logically diverse newspapers.106  If a paper covered the decision on the 
front page, the decision gets two salience points.  If the decision was 
covered elsewhere in the paper, it gets one point.  If it was not cov-
ered, it gets no points.107 
The NLRA gets a perfect eight points on the Collins-Cooper scale, 
as do iconic statutes such as the Voting Rights Act.  Even the Social 
Security Act scores only a seven, as the Chicago Tribune chose not to 
give it front page coverage.  Other indicators confirm the Collins-
Cooper measure of salience.  In the thirty days before it was signed 
into law, the NLRA was discussed108 in forty-one front page articles 
from the four papers considered by Collins and Cooper.109  The Vot-
ing Rights Act appeared in just thirty-six front page articles in the 
thirty days before it became law.110  Social Security was mentioned in 
just thirty-two articles.111 
C. Open Debate 
The final indicator that a bill is a super-statute may also be the 
least common.  Super-statutes’ tendency to capture the wisdom of 
crowds is diminished to the extent that opinion leaders unanimously 
back a given proposal.112  Therefore, a true super-statute should 
emerge from a period in which leaders and interest groups loudly 
 
salience among those readers.  See Spiro Kiousis, Explicating Media Salience:  A Factor Analy-
sis of New York Times Issue Coverage During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, 54 J. OF 
COMM. 71, 71 (2004)(summarizing the research on “agenda-setting” by the media). 
106 Those papers are the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Trib-
une.  See Collins & Cooper, supra note 105, at 4.  These papers represented a diversity of 
views during the New Deal.  The Los Angeles Times was an “Independent Republican” pa-
per in 1935, N. W. AYER & SON’S DIRECTORY OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 87 (1935), 
as was the Chicago Tribune, id. at 215.  The New York Times was “Independent Democratic.”  
Id. at 646.  The Washington Post was simply “Independent.”  Id. at 144. 
107 See Collins & Cooper, supra note 105, at 6. 
108 The count of articles that discuss a particular piece of legislation comes from searching 
for the various titles of the legislation in ProQuest.  I count an article as discussing the 
legislation if it mentions the legislation at least once.  I excluded news items that were 
merely announcing that the legislation would be discussed on the radio or on television. 
109 For the NLRA, I searched for the following key words, all of which capture a title that 
newspapers used to describe the Act:  “wagner labor disputes,” “wagner disputes bill,” 
“‘wagner bill’ and ‘labor,’” and “wagner-connery.”  I spot-checked the results to ensure 
that they only contain articles which actually discuss the NLRA. 
110 To find articles on the Voting Rights Act, I searched ProQuest for articles containing the 
term “voting bill,” “voting rights bill,” “voting rights law,” or “voting law.” 
111 To find articles on the Social Security Act, I searched ProQuest for any article containing 
the term “social security.” 
112 See supra notes 39–42, and accompanying text. 
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and effectively proclaimed different views on the issue at hand.  It is 
unusual for open debate to prevail when a mobilized populace ap-
pears passionate about a given policy proposal.  However, the NLRA 
emerged from a period of open debate. 
The main source of criticism of New Deal labor policy was, not 
surprisingly, the business community.  Business groups repeatedly ac-
cused the NLB and the NLRB of creating conditions under which 
American employers could not survive.113  Some businesses threat-
ened to boycott the NRA code system to send a message to the Ad-
ministration about its approach to labor law,114 while others simply re-
fused to comply with NLB orders.115  One company even shut down its 
operations—throwing 653 people out of work—to protest an NRA ac-
tion.116 
Another prime source of negative information about the NLRA 
was the country’s newspapers.  Newspapers almost unanimously edi-
torialized against the proposal.117  They also provided detailed cover-
age of opponents’ arguments against it.  When business leaders ar-
gued that the NLRA would stop an otherwise inevitable recovery, they 
made front page news.118  When named or unnamed individuals ques-
tioned the constitutionality of the proposal, they also received front 
 
113 Warns NRA to Stop Raising of Wages:  Durable Goods Board Suggests That Specific Needs Precede 
Price-Fixing Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1934, at 1. 
114 Louis Stark, Dropping of Steel Code to Escape Labor Clause Considered by Industry:  Hinges on 
Board Rulings:  Move is Urged to Avoid Unwelcome Collective Bargaining, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
1934, at 1. 
115 Houde Firm Is Stripped of Blue Eagle For Its Refusal to Bargain With Union, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
15, 1934, at 1.  After one particularly controversial NLB ruling, the National Association 
of Manufacturers advised its members not to comply with NLB decisions.  Employers Defy 
Bargaining Rule:  Manufacturers’ Association Advises Members to Ignore Labor Board Decision, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1934, at 1. 
116 Plant Doors Shut by Harriman Mills as Answer to NRA:  Johnson Charged with Trying to Wreck 
Concern by Taking Blue Eagle From It:  653 Employees are Out, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1934, at 1. 
117 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 67–68.  The newspapers’ objection to the proposed law 
may have had something to do with publishers’ conflict with the pre-NLRA NLRB.  After 
the Board accused a San Francisco paper of a discriminatory firing, the publishers rallied 
behind the paper and convinced the Roosevelt Administration that the Board had no ju-
risdiction in the case.  See 1,200 Newspapers to Decide if Code Has Been Breached:  Action Fol-
lows Reassertion by Labor Board of Jurisdiction in San Francisco Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1934, 
at 1.  The NLRA unambiguously gave the NLRB jurisdiction over the publishers, as Wag-
ner made clear.  See Louis Stark, Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union; Bill for 
Majority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1935, at 1. 
118 Industry Sees Recovery at Once if Congress Shelves New Laws:  Manufacturers Could Spend 
$20,000,000,000 in Factory Expansion and Rehabilitation, Giving 4,000,000 Jobs, if New Deal 
Bills Are Sidetracked, They Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1935, at 1; Steel Men Decry Curbs to Recov-
ery:  Grace Says Industry, Ready for Prosperity, Is Held Back by New Deal’s Uncertainty, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 24, 1935, at 1; Views of C. of C. on NRA, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1935, at 1. 
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page coverage.119  One front page headline informed New York Times 
readers that a prominent business leader would rather be imprisoned 
than obey labor regulations like those contained in Wagner’s pro-
posal.120  When Wagner’s proposal passed the House, the Chicago 
Tribune news coverage summarized it in two sentences:  “It would give 
the American Federation of Labor great power.  It has been frequent-
ly called unconstitutional.”121 
Of course, the biggest force in early New Deal America was almost 
certainly the Roosevelt Administration, generally considered an ally 
of organized labor.  But the Roosevelt Administration was never a 
clear or consistent supporter of the NLRA.  President Roosevelt even-
tually supported the NLRA, but his support was both late and tepid.  
When Wagner first made a labor reform proposal, in 1934, the Ad-
ministration declined to publicly support the bill.122  The White 
House played no part in drafting Wagner’s proposal and took no of-
ficial position on it.  The Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, made 
noncommittal statements, while General Johnson said nothing.123  
Lacking presidential support, Wagner withdrew his proposal in favor 
of a plan, backed by Roosevelt, which would give the President discre-
tion to create a new labor board without making any changes in labor 
law.124 
In 1935, Wagner again proposed systemic reforms, and again, the 
Administration did not participate in the drafting or take a public po-
sition on the proposal’s merits.  When the White House chose not to 
endorse the proposal, its silence was heard loud and clear by the me-
dia, weakening Wagner.125  Only Secretary Perkins expressed belat-
 
119 See, e.g., Sibley Makes Plea Here:  Chamber Head Urges Employers to Guard Hours and Wages, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 1; Wagner Bill, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1935, at 1. 
120 ‘Rather Go to Jail’ than Accept Wagner Bill, Says U.S. Steel Executive, Getting Medal, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 25, 1935, at 1. 
121 Labor and Old Age Bills Win:  Congress Acts as Roosevelt Asks New Taxes; Wants Big Fortunes 
Split, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1935, at 1. 
122 The White House’s silence allowed some papers to portray the Wagner Bill as part of the 
President’s agenda, but those close to the legislative process knew better.  See Leon H. 
Keyserling, The Wagner Act:  Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199, 
203. 
123 BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 68. 
124 J. Warren Madden, The Origin and Early History of the National Labor Relations Board, 29 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 234, 237–38 (1960). 
125 Louis Stark, Grave Labor Issues Facing White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1935, at E11 (docu-
menting organized labor’s disaffection with the Roosevelt Administration); Louis Stark, 
Wagner Seeks to Outlaw Company-Promoted Union:  Bill for Majority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
1935, at 1 (noting the lack of administration support for the Wagner Act).  It is unclear 
whether the Administration’s public silence indicates ambivalence regarding Wagner’s 
proposal or just political caution.  Leon Keyserling—Wagner’s chief aide and somebody 
 
May 2013] HOW STATUTES CREATE RIGHTS 1529 
 
ed126 support for Wagner’s effort, and her support was contingent on 
any permanent NLRB being located within the Labor Department.127  
When Wagner would not concede that point, Perkins promised to 
scuttle his bill.  Most assumed the President was on her side.128  The 
President finally endorsed the NLRA on March 24, 1935, after the bill 
had already been passed overwhelmingly by both houses of Con-
gress.129 
The passage of the NLRA cannot be explained as the result of 
powerful opinion leaders dragging their followers toward a foregone 
conclusion.  Americans witnessed a contest between organized labor 
and organized business, with the latter making strong claims that the 
NLRA was inconsistent with American values and economic recovery.  
While many Americans likely made up their minds about the Wagner 
Act based on interest group influence, the various interest groups 
competing for support during this time gave Americans a choice of 
whom to follow, with blind supporters of labor or business likely to 
cancel each other out. 
D. Summary 
Given the information available to Americans regarding the 
NLRA, the interest voters took in the matter, and the diverse view-
points expressed by powerful opinion leaders when the bill was under 
consideration, the NLRA provides an ideal example of a super-statute 
entitled to judicial deference.  But, what kind of deference?  In the 
 
with an obvious incentive to put his boss and not President Roosevelt at the center of the 
NLRA victory—has suggested that President Roosevelt invited Senator Wagner to a White 
House meeting where other senators attempted to convince Wagner to withdraw his pro-
posal.  Keyserling, supra note 122, at 202–03.  Keyserling concludes that the President 
never fully supported Wagner’s plan.  Id. at 203. 
126 BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 105; Louis Stark, Wagner Proposes New Labor Board to Top All 
Others:  Offers His Bill for National Independent Body to Assure Equality Under Sec. 7a, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1935, at 1; see also Biddle Backs the Bill:  Wagner Measure Called Vital to Exist-
ence of Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1934, at 5; Elimination of 7A Urged by Biddle:  Labor 
Relations Board Head Tells Senate Committee the Section Is Unenforceable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1934, at 8. 
127 Labor Secretary Backs Wagner Bill:  But Miss Perkins Opposes Making Board Independent of Her 
Department, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1935, at 12. 
128 Louis Stark, Labor’s Pet Bills Run Into Trouble:  President Refuses to Commit Himself to Guffey 
Coal Stabilization Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1935, at 22. 
129 NLRB Legislative History, at 3112.  Even after the Administration officially endorsed the 
bill, disagreement within the Administration could be seen.  Both Houses Clear Wagner La-
bor Bill:  Conference Report on ‘Must’ Measure Is Quickly Adopted and President Will Sign It, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 1935, at 6 (“Passage of the bill making the board independent was a dis-
appointment to Secretary Perkins.”).  For an argument that Roosevelt’s support came too 
late to make a difference, see Keyserling, supra note 122, at 203. 
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next Part, I conclude by applying the super-statute concept to a fre-
quently criticized labor law case and showing how doctrine would 
look different if courts took super-statutes seriously. 
III.  A SUPER-STATUTE IN PRACTICE:  REINTERPRETING THE NLRA 
Parts I and II argued that the NLRA should be treated as a super-
statute.  This Part will explain what that would look like in practice by 
considering a Supreme Court case that would have come out differ-
ently if the Court had treated the NLRA as a super-statute. Lechmere, 
Inc. v. NLRB,130 has been criticized by pro-labor academics, but these 
critics have not provided an alternative framework for analysis that 
they would be willing to apply consistently.  The theory of super-
statutes provides such a framework. 
A. The Trouble with Lechmere 
The Lechmere case began when union organizers from the United 
Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) were removed from the 
parking lot of a retail store owned by Lechmere, Inc., where they had 
been leaving handbills on the cars of the store’s employees.131  The 
union had already reached out to workers through newspaper ads 
with no success.132  After they were removed from the parking lot, they 
tried carrying signs on a narrow strip of grass near the store as a 
means of informing workers about the ongoing organizing cam-
paign.133  This too failed.134 
The UFCW filed a complaint with the NLRB accusing Lechmere 
of an unfair labor practice.  The Board ruled that under the circum-
stances, Lechmere had a duty to provide the organizers access to 
company property.135  The First Circuit agreed,136 but the Supreme 
Court reversed.  According to the Court, organizers are not protected 
by the NLRA’s Section 7, which speaks only of “employees.”137  Sec-
tion 7 applies to organizers “only derivatively”138 and must be bal-
anced against employers’ property rights.139  Thus, the rights of or-
 
130 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
131 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 529–30. 
132 Id. at 540. 
133 Id. at 530. 
134 Id. 
135 Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 92, 97–98 (1989). 
136 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313, 324–25 (1st Cir. 1990). 
137 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 531–32. 
138 Id. at 533. 
139 Id. at 537. 
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ganizers can be overridden provided employees have some way of 
learning that an organizing drive is taking place.140 
Lechmere has drawn extensive scholarly criticism.141  Much of the 
criticism relates not to the Court’s reasoning in Lechmere but to its 
reasoning in a case the Lechmere Court relied on:  NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co.142  Like Lechmere, Babcock presented a conflict between 
property rights and the NLRA.  The Court responded by balancing 
the rights protected by the NLRA against the employer’s property 
rights, with the result that the Court allowed the employer to exclude 
organizers.  A balancing test was necessary, the Court reasoned, be-
cause “[o]rganization rights are granted to workers by the same au-
thority, the National Government, that preserves property rights.”143  
Of course, as many scholars have pointed out,144 this is simply untrue.  
NLRA rights flow from the national government, but property rights 
are rooted in state common law.  When the two conflict, the former 
should control. 
If the Lechmere Court had balanced statutory rights granted by the 
NLRA against common law property rights, it could rightly be criti-
cized for grafting a judicial exception onto Congress’s statute.  But, it 
is not clear that this is what the Court did.  The Court’s reasoning re-
lies less on a decision to balance statutory rights against property 
rights than on a conclusion that union organizers do not have any 
statutory rights to begin with.  After all, the Lechmere Court concluded 
that organizers are not employees, and only employees have Section 7 
rights.145  If the Court went on to balance organizers’ “derivative” 
rights against employers’ property rights, this represents not so much 
a diminution of statutory rights as a creation of nonstatutory rights, 
albeit weak ones.  In other words, if organizers are not employees 
within the meaning of the NLRA, the Lechmere Court might be criti-
 
140 Id. at 539–40. 
141 See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 223, 268 (2005); Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 3, at 305; Moshe Zvi Marvit, On the 
Greatest Property Transfer That Wasn’t:  How the National Labor Relations Act Chose Employee 
Rights and the Supreme Court Chose Property Rights, 38 S.U. L. REV. 79, 103 (2010); see also Mi-
chael L. Stevens, Comment, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private Property Rights:  
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1337 n.99 
(summarizing criticism of Lechmere in the press). 
142 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
143 Id. at 112. 
144 See Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 3, at 311, 334; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property 
Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 891, 944 (2006); James Gray Pope, How 
Americans Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 543–44 (2004). 
145 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). 
1532 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:5 
 
cized for giving them rights not provided by that statute, but it cannot 
be criticized for diluting rights that never existed in the first place. 
Thus, the question in Lechmere is simply whether union organizers 
are “employees” under the NLRA.  The Supreme Court did not do 
itself any favors when it reasoned through this question.  Rather than 
look to the text of the NLRA, the Court seemed to assume that em-
ployees are protected only from interference by their own employ-
er.146  Thus, Lechmere could clearly remove organizers from its prop-
erty, as these organizers were not employed by Lechmere.  As 
scholars have pointed out,147 this assumption is clearly wrong.  The 
NLRA provides that the term “employee” is not limited to the em-
ployees of a particular employer.148  If Pepsi employees want to en-
gage in collective action, Coke could not interfere any more than 
Pepsi could. 
Some scholars end the analysis here and conclude that the 
Lechmere Court simply misread the NLRA.149  But, the Act has more to 
say about the definition of “employee.”  Employees must be em-
ployed by an employer, and unions, according to the statute, are not 
employers.150  While the Court never said as much, its ruling in 
Lechmere could plausibly be read as an interpretation of the language 
in the NLRA that renders unions non-employers and their employees 
non-employees. 
Professor James Gray Pope has a response to this argument.  He 
looks to the intent of the NLRA and concludes that unions were ex-
empted from the Act’s definition of employer so that they would not 
be covered by other provisions limiting the ability of employers to 
participate in workers’ decisions regarding union representation.151  
Since the Act exempted unions from the definition of employer in 
order to enhance their ability to organize workers, argues Pope, it 
would be “ironic” to interpret this exemption in such a way as to deny 
organizers protections needed to reach unorganized workers.152 
 
146 Id. 
147 Estlund, supra note 3, at 326 (“The literal terms of the Act should thus make it unlawful 
for an employer to interfere with efforts to ‘assist’ a union by employees other than its 
own, including union organizers.”); Pope, supra note 144, at 541–43. 
148 National Labor Relations Act § 2(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)). 
149 Estlund, supra note 3, at 326. 
150 National Labor Relations Act § 2(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006)) (“The term 
‘employer’ . . . shall not include . . . any labor organization (other than when acting as an 
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organiza-
tion.”). 
151 Pope, supra note 144, at 542. 
152 Id. 
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Professor Cynthia Estlund has another response.  According to 
Estlund, “[t]he economic theory of unionism, which the framers of 
the 1935 Wagner Act largely adopted, recognizes that the effective-
ness of collective bargaining depends on a union’s ability to organize 
across employer lines.”153  Union organizing is a collective act between 
organized workers and those they—through union organizers acting 
as their agents—seek to organize.154  Since Section 7 protects collec-
tive action, it must protect union organizers—not because organizers 
enjoy “derivative rights” based on the rights of unorganized workers, 
but because they are directly protected by the Section 7 rights of the 
organized workers they represent.155 
Both Pope and Estlund rely on a particular vision of what the 
NLRA sought to accomplish.  Pope focuses on the intent of Congress 
in exempting unions from the definition of “employer.”  Estlund fo-
cuses on the “economic theory of unionism” that motivated the 
NLRA.  But, both arguments work only to the extent that readers or 
courts are willing to look beyond the text of the Act to the intent of 
Congress in passing it.  Not everybody is willing to make this move. 
B. Lechmere, New Textualism, and Hoffman Plastic 
At one point, most courts would have followed Pope and Estlund 
in consulting indicators of congressional intent other than the statute 
itself.156  Today, courts tend to take statutes at face value.157  In 
Lechmere, this approach would favor the outcome the Court reached.  
Since union organizers are not clearly covered by the text of the stat-
ute, courts would have to look to the statute’s purpose to find organ-
izer protections. 
 
153 Estland, supra note 3, at 327. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 326–28. 
156 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“It is a familiar 
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, be-
cause not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626–27 (1990) (describing the 
“traditional” approach to statutory interpretation, which uses non-textual sources to fer-
ret out congressional intent). 
157 See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 156, at 656–66 (documenting the rise of New 
Textualism in the Supreme Court).  The change in approach does not necessarily reflect 
a change in doctrine.  Courts might agree that they will look beyond the text of a statute 
only when the text is unclear, while disagreeing vehemently about when a statutory text is 
unclear.  In practice, the rise of New Textualism does not foreclose the use of extra-
textual sources, but it does limit the circumstances under which these sources will be de-
cisive. 
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Courts’ tendency to focus on the text of statutes reflects the influ-
ence of a set of ideas that can be roughly attributed to the New Tex-
tualism Movement.158  New Textualists justify their approach by attack-
ing the idea that laws generally reflect a coherent purpose beyond 
the provisions contained in their texts.  Legislation is almost always 
the product of compromise.159  Reformers may have achieved enough 
power to change the status quo, but they have inevitably compro-
mised with some lawmakers and interest groups who would rather 
preserve the status quo and others that would prefer different chang-
es.  Judges who expand a law to achieve more than the text demands 
have privileged one side of a negotiation over another, giving an in-
terest group more than it could win at the bargaining table.  This, ac-
cording to the New Textualists, is not the judge’s role.160 
Some scholars go further, arguing that the whole idea of group in-
tent is incoherent.  Relying on Public Choice Theory, and particularly 
the work of Kenneth Arrow,161 these writers argue that it simply makes 
no sense to speak of the intent of a group the way we speak of the in-
tent of an individual.  Legislation is the contingent product of a par-
ticular set of circumstances and procedures.  Asking what a group of 
lawmakers would have thought about an issue it never in fact consid-
ered is like asking who would have won a sporting competition, and 
by how much, without specifying the rules of the game.  When courts 
attribute an unexpressed purpose to a legislative text, they are simply 
 
158 See id. at 626–27. 
159 This idea has been popularized in large part by scholars in the law-and-economics tradi-
tion, who see policymaking as a process of negotiation and compromise between compet-
ing interest groups.  Just as a contract negotiated between Walmart and General Motors 
cannot be said to have the general intent of promoting either party’s values, a statute ne-
gotiated between different interest groups and their congressional champions cannot be 
said to represent any one party’s views of the world.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 
894 (1975); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
terpretation:  An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (1986). 
160 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (Scalia, J.); 
Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 49 F.3d 1269, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.  Deciding what competing values will 
or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of 
legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically 
to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” (quot-
ing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987)); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat-
utes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546 (1983) (“[J]udicial pursuit of the ‘values’ or 
aims of legislation is a sure way of defeating the original legislative plan.”). 
161 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 204 (2d ed. 1963). 
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imposing their own values on something that, on its own, has no such 
thing.162 
The New Textualist approach reflects the common sense wisdom 
that if it ain’t broke, courts should not fix it.  The status quo, whatev-
er its flaws, enjoys a presumption of validity if only because we have 
learned to live with it.163  Nobody would want to live in a world where 
everything is in flux at every moment.164 
The criticisms of Lechmere discussed above could be seen as predi-
cated on the belief that New Textualism is the wrong way to do statu-
tory interpretation.  But, I suspect that Pope and Estlund would not 
always agree with an approach to statutory interpretation that reads 
statutes expansively to reflect a court’s interpretation of statutory 
purpose.  For example, both have expressed their disagreement with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB165 to read the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986166 
(“IRCA”) as precluding backpay for undocumented workers.167  Yet, 
that case is easily defensible if courts can expand statutory texts to re-
flect a plausible reading of congressional intent.  Even Estlund has 
admitted that Congress was “exquisitely ambiguous”168 on the ques-
tion of backpay when it passed the IRCA.  It seems likely that many of 
the members of Congress who supported the IRCA intended to deny 
undocumented workers any benefit tied in any way to the employ-
ment relationship.  The Court’s error in Hoffman Plastic was not that 
it chose an indefensible interpretation of congressional intent, but 
that it chose one interpretation and elevated it above the text of the 
 
162 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 38–42 (1991); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2001). 
163 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 
937 (1992); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 891–92 (1996); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation:  An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 264–65 
(1986) (arguing that statutes interfere with efficient common law rules). 
164 See Strauss, supra note 163, at 892 (“[I]t is simply too time consuming and difficult to 
reexamine everything from the ground up.”); Cass Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 353, 362–86 (2006).  While Sunstein does not identify with Burke’s support 
for tradition as such, he agrees with the Burkeans that “[n]o real-world minimalist is like-
ly to want to subject many traditions to critical scrutiny, at least not at the same time.” 
Sunstein, supra at 367. 
165 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
166 Pub. L. No. 99-603, Title I, § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a). 
167 See Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Cases of the 2001–2002 Term, 
18 LAB. LAW. 291, 316–17 (2002); James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Traf-
ficking, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1868 (2010). 
168 Estlund, supra note 167, at 315. 
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Act.  While the Court’s outcome is no doubt reprehensible to Estlund 
and Pope (and to me), its approach to interpreting the IRCA is con-
sistent with their approach to interpreting the NLRA. 
The theory of super-statutes allows courts to avoid the outcome in 
Lechmere without risking the outcome in Hoffman Plastic.  It counsels a 
purposivist approach to statutes like the NLRA and a New Textualist 
approach to statutes like the IRCA.169  And, it provides a principled 
means for determining when to adopt the former approach and 
when to adopt the latter. 
This is because the justifications for New Textualism ring hollow 
when courts interpret super-statutes.  To understand why, it helps to 
remember that statutes are not black marks on a white background.  
When courts choose to apply preexisting law—whether derived from 
the common law or from a statute—they engage in lawmaking every 
bit as much as when they apply principles derived from statutes.  
Courts are condemned to choose.  The question is whether they will 
choose the status quo or the statutory change to the status quo. 
Under normal circumstances, there are compelling reasons to 
stick with the status quo.  Further, it may be difficult for courts to 
identify and apply a unifying principle embedded in a statute.  When 
a court interprets a super-statute, however, the status quo has general-
ly been rejected.  The kind of popular mobilization that occurs when 
a super-statute is passed is unlikely when Americans are broadly satis-
fied with the way things are.  Thus, the New Textualist bias in favor of 
the status quo is inappropriate when courts interpret super-statutes.  
At the same time, it makes more sense to speak of a collective will in 
the context of a statute produced after prolonged public discussion 
of the values and ideas that motivate that enactment.  When a policy 
change follows a period of in-depth public debate, courts should be 
able to more easily determine a clear motivating principle behind the 
change.170 
 
169 I assume here that the IRCA does not qualify as a super-statute. 
170 Even Judge Easterbrook grants that a broad, purposivist interpretation of statutes is ap-
propriate if statutes were generally intended to serve the public interest.  Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Foreword:  The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984) (“If 
statutes generally are designed to overcome ‘failures’ in markets and to replace the ca-
lamities produced by unguided private conduct with the ordered rationality of the public 
sector, then it makes sense to use the remedial approach to the construction of statutes—
or at least most of them.”).  One way to describe super-statute theory that might be more 
acceptable to the law-and-economics tradition is as a claim that when the public is closely 
watching its elected representatives on a particular issue, the various collective action 
problems that generally prevent public-spirited legislation do not come into play, and 
lawmakers generally produce legislation in the public interest.  In these cases, generous 
statutory interpretation is warranted. 
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C. The Lechmere Problem in Other Cases 
Lechmere is not the only precedent that would fall if the NLRA re-
ceived the treatment it deserves.  Professor Ellen Dannin has shown 
how the remedies available for violations of labor law—one of the 
most destructive areas of labor law171—could be transformed if the 
courts interpreted the NLRA in light of what she calls “NLRA val-
ues.”172  At the same time, many of those areas of labor law doctrine 
that protect workers rely on courts treating the NLRA as a super-
statute without explicitly justifying the approach.  A major part of the 
basic foundation of labor law was built more on purpose than on text.  
In J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,173 one of the first cases to establish the princi-
ple that collective bargaining is inconsistent with individual contracts 
between employers and employees, the Supreme Court began by ad-
mitting that the language of the NLRA did not settle the issue.174  It 
based its ruling instead on “the practice and philosophy of collective 
bargaining.”175  If courts and the Board chose to limit the NLRA to its 
express terms, even J.I. Case would be in danger. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article was to show that the NLRA deserves better.  
Adopting a term made popular by William Eskridge and John Fere-
john, I have argued that the NLRA should be treated as a super-
statute.  Unlike Eskridge and Ferejohn, however, I derived the justifi-
cation for treating certain statutes with special deference—and thus 
the prerequisites for such treatment—from first principles.  My goal 
in Part I was to develop the beginnings of a normative justification for 
the theory of super-statutes.  Applying this framework, Part II makes 
the case that the NLRA fits a normatively defensible definition of su-
per-statutes.  Part III explains why super-statute theory matters.  It 
shows that pro-labor academics tend to interpret the NLRA in light of 
broad principles that go beyond the Act’s text, while denying similar 
treatment to other statutes.  The super-statute theory provides a justi-
fication for this approach and a principled means for determining 
when to read a statute broadly.  It gives judges a framework for giving 
 
171 See Cynthia L. Estlund, supra note 2, at 1537; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep:  Securing 
Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787–96 (1983). 
172 Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
223, 225 (2005). 
173 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
174 Id. at 336. 
175 Id. at 338. 
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the people what they want when they speak with one voice, while 
avoiding the problems that can come with expansive interpretations 
of everyday statutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
